Volume 26, Issue 3 (Autunm 2021)                   JPBUD 2021, 26(3): 3-28 | Back to browse issues page

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Bakhshi-ani R, Nili M, Barakchian M. Rule of Law and Political Power. JPBUD. 2021; 26 (3) :3-28
URL: http://jpbud.ir/article-1-2063-en.html
1- Faculty of Management and Economics, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.
2- Faculty of Management and Economics, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran , m.nili@sharif.ir
3- Assistant Professor, Institute for Management and Planning Studies, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract:   (928 Views)
The purpose of this article is to examine the effect of political power on rule of law as a basis for economic development. Political power consists of two key components: power transition and power distribution. Power might be centralized in the hands of a small group or distributed among different groups. Power transition is also distinguished by democratic or non-democratic power. In the present study, the application of descriptive-analytical approach provides evidence that centralized political power leads to the violation of citizens’ rights by the politicians. Conversely, decentralized political power restricts the politicians and consequently, prevents the violation of legal rights. Then, the application of an empirical approach and the analysis of 102 countries’ data reveal that intensification in political power concentration will reduce the rule of law quality. In addition, the results indicate that controlling the power distribution effect will remarkably reduce the power transition’s effect on the quality of rule of law. Sensitivity analysis also demonstrates the results’ stability after changing the dependent variable, adding other control variables and using the instrumental variable method.
Full-Text [PDF 595 kb]   (197 Downloads)    
Type of Study: Research | Subject: law and economics
Received: 2021/11/14 | Accepted: 2022/01/15 | ePublished: 2022/03/6

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