<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE ArticleSet PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD PubMed 2.0//EN" "http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov:80/entrez/query/static/PubMed.dtd">
<ArticleSet>
<Article>
<Journal>
<PublisherName>Institute for Management and Planning studies</PublisherName>
<JournalTitle></JournalTitle>
<Issn>2251-9092</Issn>
<Volume>22</Volume>
<Issue>2</Issue>
<PubDate PubStatus = "ppublish">
<Year>2017</Year>
<Month>9</Month>
<Day>1</Day>
</PubDate>
</Journal>


	<ArticleTitle>An Analysis of Iran’s Economic Growth Challenges: Macroeconometric Modelling Approach</ArticleTitle>
	<FirstPage>3</FirstPage>
	<LastPage>41</LastPage>
	<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
	<Author>
	<FirstName>Hassan</FirstName>
	<LastName>Dargahi</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Shahid Beheshti University</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


</AuthorList>
<Abstract>This paper examines the economic growth challenges of&#160;Iran`s economy for the period 2017-2021, based on estimating and&#160;analyzing a acroeconometric model. The results of the baseline scenario&#160;show that even with no economic sanctions, and assuming gradual&#160;increase in production and oil export the economic growth would be about 3 percent per year on average during the above mentioned period. Thus, for the purpose of economic stability and productivity improvement, a set of reform policies should be adopted. According to the findings of&#160;different policy simulation of the model, the low annual economic growth in the baseline scenario could be improved to 5 percent through various&#160;policy reforms such as conducting specific rules for fiscal, monetary,&#160;exchange rate and energy pricing policies, with emphasis on the national&#160;development fund`s role in stabilizing government budget. However, to achieve sustainable development with high economic growth and low&#160;unemployment, it is necessary to implement outward-oriented policies&#160;toward more openness and domestic private investments.</Abstract>


</Article>
<Article>
<Journal>
<PublisherName>Institute for Management and Planning studies</PublisherName>
<JournalTitle></JournalTitle>
<Issn>2251-9092</Issn>
<Volume>22</Volume>
<Issue>2</Issue>
<PubDate PubStatus = "ppublish">
<Year>2017</Year>
<Month>9</Month>
<Day>1</Day>
</PubDate>
</Journal>


	<ArticleTitle>Liquidity Shortages, Competition for Deposits, and Central Bank Policies</ArticleTitle>
	<FirstPage>43</FirstPage>
	<LastPage>69</LastPage>
	<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
	<Author>
	<FirstName>Seyed Ali</FirstName>
	<LastName> Madanizade</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Graduate School of Management and Economics, Sharif University of Technology,  Tehran</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


	<Author>
	<FirstName>Amirabbas</FirstName>
	<LastName> Salarkia</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Graduate School of Management and Economics, Sharif University of Technology</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


	<Author>
	<FirstName>Amineh</FirstName>
	<LastName> Mahmoodzadeh</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Sharif University of Technology</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


</AuthorList>
<Abstract>In the case of a liquidity shortage crisis, illiquid banks start to compete in the deposit market to absorb liquidity, in order to prevent fire-selling their assets. This paper attempts to show that in such crisis, not only the competition in the deposit market does not improve the liquidity needs of these banks but it also raises the deposit interest rates in the market, increases the cost of fund for financial institutions and reduces their power to manage their other obligations. The findings indicate that with high liquidity shortages, there is a contagion in the market such that the liquid banks become illiquid too, declining their financial stability. From this perspective, the results provide a theoretical rationale in favor of central bank&#8217;s intervention. This study analyzes various central bank policies and regulation which can reduce these inefficiencies in the market and compare their effectiveness; these policies and regulations include: deposit rate cap, cap rates in the interbank market, excluding illiquid banks from entering the interbank market, interbank intervention by injection and short term bailouts.</Abstract>


</Article>
<Article>
<Journal>
<PublisherName>Institute for Management and Planning studies</PublisherName>
<JournalTitle></JournalTitle>
<Issn>2251-9092</Issn>
<Volume>22</Volume>
<Issue>2</Issue>
<PubDate PubStatus = "ppublish">
<Year>2017</Year>
<Month>9</Month>
<Day>1</Day>
</PubDate>
</Journal>


	<ArticleTitle>The Impact of Governance Quality on Migration of Highly Educated Persons</ArticleTitle>
	<FirstPage>71</FirstPage>
	<LastPage>108</LastPage>
	<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
	<Author>
	<FirstName>Hossein</FirstName>
	<LastName> Raghfar</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Department of Economics, Alzahra University</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


	<Author>
	<FirstName>Masoud</FirstName>
	<LastName>Mohammadi Alamuti</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Institute for Management and Planning Studies</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


	<Author>
	<FirstName>Elham </FirstName>
	<LastName>Fakheremoosavi</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Alzahra University</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


</AuthorList>
<Abstract>This article examines the impact of governance quality on the migration of highly educated persons. Using human capital and social transition theories of migration, two hypotheses are proposed. The&#160;cross-sectional data (for 1990 and 2000) have been used to test the&#160;hypotheses via the framework of a random utility model. Principal&#160;Component Analysis (PCA) is used to build a composite index of governance quality. Testing the hypotheses denotes that the significant gap between the selected Asian and European-American countries as for their quality of governance, has intensified the migration of highly educated persons from the selected developing countries to developed ones. Accordingly, the main policy insight of this paper is that in order to moderate such migration, the&#160;developing countries should take some measures to improve their&#160;transparency and accountability, rule of law, political stability, state&#160;
effectiveness, and better rules. In short-term, developing countries need to take some measures in order to employ the capacities of their own educated persons. This insight is more important for Iran, because as for the migration of highly educated persons, it has recently been ranked as very high among the developing countries.&#160;</Abstract>


</Article>
<Article>
<Journal>
<PublisherName>Institute for Management and Planning studies</PublisherName>
<JournalTitle></JournalTitle>
<Issn>2251-9092</Issn>
<Volume>22</Volume>
<Issue>2</Issue>
<PubDate PubStatus = "ppublish">
<Year>2017</Year>
<Month>9</Month>
<Day>1</Day>
</PubDate>
</Journal>


	<ArticleTitle>The Impact of Countries’ Previous Legal Disputes in WTO on Their Current Cases</ArticleTitle>
	<FirstPage>109</FirstPage>
	<LastPage>136</LastPage>
	<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
	<Author>
	<FirstName>Homa</FirstName>
	<LastName>Taheri</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Institute for Management and Planning Studies</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


	<Author>
	<FirstName>Kowsar</FirstName>
	<LastName>Yousefi</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Institute for Management and Planning Studies</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


</AuthorList>
<Abstract>The dispute resolution mechanism in the World Trade&#160;Organization is a way of leveraging in the political and economic relationships. Countries&#8217; legal knowledge plays a substantial role on disputes&#8217; initiation and continuation. This study assesses the effect of previous WTO disputes on the hazard rate of attendance in a new one, using survival analysis. Our dataset&#160;encompasses 427 disputes from 1995 to 2011. Results indicate that 1%&#160;increase in a country&#8217;s number of previous disputes is associated with a 2.40% higher hazard rate of attendance in a new dispute. The highly elastic behavior of hazard rate with regard to past experiences is confirmed for both respondents&#160;and complainants. Moreover, we find that developing countries and GATT members are more likely to enter a dispute. Results are robust with respect to variation in model and control variables.</Abstract>


</Article>
<Article>
<Journal>
<PublisherName>Institute for Management and Planning studies</PublisherName>
<JournalTitle></JournalTitle>
<Issn>2251-9092</Issn>
<Volume>22</Volume>
<Issue>2</Issue>
<PubDate PubStatus = "ppublish">
<Year>2017</Year>
<Month>9</Month>
<Day>1</Day>
</PubDate>
</Journal>


	<ArticleTitle>The Impact of Election Cycles on Inflation in Selected Developing and Developed Countries</ArticleTitle>
	<FirstPage>137</FirstPage>
	<LastPage>156</LastPage>
	<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
	<Author>
	<FirstName>Abolfazl</FirstName>
	<LastName> Shahabadi</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Science and Economics</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


	<Author>
	<FirstName>Saeid</FirstName>
	<LastName>Siyahvashi</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Bu-Ali Sina University</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


	<Author>
	<FirstName>Vahid</FirstName>
	<LastName>Omidi</LastName>
	<Affiliation>Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Bu-Ali Sina University,</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


</AuthorList>
<Abstract>Following the influential Nordhaus (1975) article, investigation of the influence of political variables on the macroeconomic ones became an interesting subject matter for economic analyses. In this regard, the impact of elections on economic variables, which in the economic literature has been interpreted as &#8220;election cycles&#8221;, is one of the most prominent political phenomena. Policymakers, aiming for being re-elected in the following election, try to behave in particular ways that are favorable to voters. The present study attempts to investigate the impact of &#8220;electoral cycles&#8221; on the inflation rate in the selected countries. In view of that, this study examines the impact of election cycle&#8217;s sub-component (election year index, government ideology, minority government, and coalition) on the inflation rate in the developed and developing countries for the period 1994- 2012. The results of the dynamic panel method estimation show that during the election year, policymakers, irrespective of the degree of development of the target countries or policymakers&#8217; ideology, try to reduce the inflation rate.&#160;</Abstract>


</Article>
<Article>
<Journal>
<PublisherName>Institute for Management and Planning studies</PublisherName>
<JournalTitle></JournalTitle>
<Issn>2251-9092</Issn>
<Volume>22</Volume>
<Issue>2</Issue>
<PubDate PubStatus = "ppublish">
<Year>2017</Year>
<Month>9</Month>
<Day>1</Day>
</PubDate>
</Journal>


	<ArticleTitle>​A Study of the Nature of Arbitration Panel (Article 30 of Iran's Law on Implementation of General Policies of Principle 44) with 
Attention to the Judicial Precedent</ArticleTitle>
	<FirstPage>157</FirstPage>
	<LastPage>182</LastPage>
	<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
	<Author>
	<FirstName></FirstName>
	<LastName></LastName>
	<Affiliation>Department of Law, Institute for Management and Planning Studies (IMPS)</Affiliation>
	 </Author>


</AuthorList>
<Abstract>Under the third chapter of Iran&#39;s Third Five-year Development&#160;&#160;Plan, titled as &#34;Ceding the Shares and Management of Governmental&#160;Companies&#34;, an arbitration panel is established for settling the disputes arising out of ceding processes. This panel was further validated in the article 30 of the Law on Implementation of General Policies of Principle 44. However, a question might arise that whether the established panel is indeed arbitration in the real sense, or it is a mere similarity in title. In order to answer this question, two different approaches are considered in this study. In the first approach, some fundamental essences of arbitration are selected; then the arbitration panel of the Third Development Plan is&#160;examined in each and all essences to see whether it fulfills the requirements of arbitration. In the second approach, Iran&#39;s judicial precedent with regard to this arbitration panel is studied to see whether, under Iranian judicial system,&#160;this panel is considered as arbitration or not. While both approaches&#160;demonstrate some inconsistencies and ambiguities in the legal nature of&#160;so-called Arbitration Panel, they both concur that this is not arbitration in the real sense</Abstract>


</Article>
</ArticleSet>
