Volume 28, Issue 2 (Summer 2023)
JPBUD 2023, 28(2): 155-188 |
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Parsa O, Ghaffari F, Dejpasand F. (2023). Designing an Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Mechanism of Self-Adjusting in the Provincial Income-Expenditure System. JPBUD. 28(2), 155-188. doi:10.61186/jpbud.28.2.155
URL: http://jpbud.ir/article-1-2215-en.html
URL: http://jpbud.ir/article-1-2215-en.html
1- Faculty of Management and Economic, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran. , parsa_omid_ali@yahoo.com
2- Faculty of Management and Economic, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
3- Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.
2- Faculty of Management and Economic, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
3- Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract: (1235 Views)
Mechanism design theory is the art of designing and guaranteeing a set of political and motivational rules in the interaction environment which, by creating the necessary and sufficient internal motivation in the agents, coordinates their behaviors in such a way that simultaneously realizes the individual goals and interests of the agents, and also the collective results desired by the policymakers and planners. This research aims to design efficient and incentive-compatible mechanisms of self-regulation in the income-expenditure system of the provinces, to concurrently maximize the incentive to collect provincial public revenues and reduce provincial imbalances. The library method, in the form of studying the existing laws and regulations, and documents, was used to collect data and information for 2022, and were analyzed in accordance with the approach of mechanism design theory. The findings of the present study show that by creating a complete and guaranteed dependence between the expression and collection of provincial public revenues with the amount of allocation of credits for the acquisition of provincial capital assets, and also the restoration of other provincial spending credits and the acquisition of capital assets, sufficient internal motivation in the provinces can be created. Such informed motivation maximizes the province's income and credit and realizes the provincial balances so that in the first year of implementation, at least 100 Hemats (thousand billion Rials) will be added to the country's general income in addition to the usual process.
Keywords: Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms of Self-Regulation, Allocation Efficiency, Provincial Public Revenues, Other Provincial Spending Credits, Credits for the Acquisition of Provincial Capital Asset
Type of Study: Research |
Subject:
public economics
Received: Jun 24 2023 | Accepted: Sep 04 2023 | ePublished: Oct 30 2023
Received: Jun 24 2023 | Accepted: Sep 04 2023 | ePublished: Oct 30 2023
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