Volume 26, Issue 1 (Spring 2021)                   JPBUD 2021, 26(1): 115-141 | Back to browse issues page

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Ahmadi V, Shahnazi R, Eslamloueyan K, Sadraei Javaheri A. (2021). Evaluation of Tax Evasion Models Based on the Views from Neoclassical to Behavioral Economics: Analytical Hierarchy Process Approach in Economy of Iran. JPBUD. 26(1), 115-141. doi:10.52547/jpbud.26.1.115
URL: http://jpbud.ir/article-1-1993-en.html
Evaluation of Tax Evasion Models Based on the Views from Neoclassical to Behavioral Economics: Analytical Hierarchy Process Approach in Economy of Iran
Vahideh Ahmadi1 , Roohollah Shahnazi * 2, Karim Eslamloueyan3 , Ahmad Sadraei Javaheri4
1- Faculty of Economics, Management and Social Sciences, University of Shiraz, Shiraz, Iran.
2- Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Management and Social Sciences, University of Shiraz, Shiraz, Iran , Rshahnazi2004@yahoo.com
3- Faculty of Economics, Department of Economics, Management and Social Sciences, University of Shiraz, Shiraz, Iran.
4- Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Management and Social Sciences, University of Shiraz, Shiraz, Iran.
Abstract:   (2649 Views)
Taxes, as the most important source of government revenue and one of the economic policy instruments, play a key role in development policies. In this study, the evolution process of different models of tax evasion (from neoclassical approach to behavioral economics) is investigated, also the assumptions and variables of these models are analyzed. Then, using the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) based on the opinions of tax experts, the factors affecting tax evasion are ranked in different models to determine which model is superior in explaining and measuring the factors affecting tax evasion in Iran. The results show that instability of preferences, loss avoidance, and ambiguity avoidance are the main factors influencing tax evasion. Correspondingly, rational behavior and behavioral adaptation have the least explanatory power as regards tax evasion in Iran. Based on the results, in analyzing and measuring Iran's tax evasion, a paradigm shift towards behavioral economy models is needed.
Keywords: Tax Evasion, Neoclassical Economics, Behavioral Economics, Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), Tax Policy.
Full-Text [PDF 1547 kb]   (1122 Downloads)    
Type of Study: Research | Subject: public economics
Received: Mar 14 2021 | Accepted: May 31 2021 | ePublished: Sep 08 2021
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