Tehran Institute for Advanced Studies, Khatam University , hadi.p1367@yahoo.com
Abstract: (210 Views)
This paper presents a model to explain choice behavior in contexts where expanding the set of available options leads decision makers to select alternatives that would not have been justifiable under more limited choice sets. Unlike existing justification-based models, in which the difficulty of justifying a choice increases with the number of alternatives—potentially leading to a preference for smaller sets—our framework ensures that welfare does not decrease as the choice set expands. Thus, the model upholds the principle that "more is better." Following the model’s introduction, we examine the implications for revealed preferences and identify a characterizing axiom that distinguishes this framework. This axiom provides a basis for non-parametric empirical testing of the model.
Keywords: Justification Constraint, Justifiable Choice, Revealed Preferences, Weak Axiom of Justifiable Choice, Two-Stage Choice.
References
1. Andreoni, J., Rao, J. M., & Trachtman, H. (2017). Avoiding the ask: A field experiment on altruism, empathy, and charitable giving. Journal of political Economy, 125(3), 625-653. [DOI:10.1086/691703]
2. Andreoni, J., & Sanchez, A. (2020). Fooling myself or fooling observers? avoiding social pressures by manipulating perceptions of deservingness of others. Economic Inquiry, 58(1), 12-33. [DOI:10.1111/ecin.12777]
3. Baigent, N., & Gaertner, W. (1996). Never choose the uniquely largest A Characterization. Economic Theory, 8(2), 239-249. [https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01211816] [DOI:10.1007/s001990050089]
4. Barokas, G. (2021). Dynamic choice under familiarity-based attention. Social Choice and Welfare, 57(4), 703-720. [DOI:10.1007/s00355-021-01335-w]
5. Barokas, G., & Ünveren, B. (2022). Impressionable Rational Choice: Revealed-Preference Theory with Framing Effects. Mathematics, 10(23), 4496. [DOI:10.3390/math10234496]
6. Bicchieri, C., Dimant, E., & Sonderegger, S. (2018). It's not a lie if you believe it: Lying and belief distortion under norm-uncertainty. Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) Working Papers, University of Pennsylvania. [DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3243973]
7. Bossert, W., Suzumura, K. (2009). External Norms and Rationality of Choice. Economics and Philosophy, 25(2), 139-152. [DOI:10.1017/S0266267109990010]
8. Bossert, W., & Suzumura, K. (2011). Rationality, external norms, and the epistemic value of menus. Social Choice and Welfare, 37(4), 729. [DOI:10.1007/s00355-011-0568-8]
9. Cherepanov, V., Feddersen, T., Sandroni, A. (2013). Rationalization. Theoretical Economics, 8(3), 775-800. [DOI:10.3982/TE970]
10. Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007). Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. Economic Theory, 33(1), 67-80. [DOI:10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z]
11. Dean, M., Kıbrıs, Ö., Masatlioglu, Y., (2017). Limited attention and status quo bias. Journal of Economic Theory, 169, pp. 93-127. [DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.009]
12. De Clippel, G., & Rozen, K. (2021). Bounded rationality and limited data sets. Theoretical Economics, 16(2), 359-380. [DOI:10.3982/TE4070]
13. Demirkan, Y., & Kimya, M. (2020). Hazard rate, stochastic choice and consideration sets. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 87, 142-150. [DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.01.008]
14. Di Tella, R., Perez-Truglia, R., Babino, A., & Sigman, M. (2015). Conveniently upset: avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. American Economic Review, 105(11), 3416-42. [DOI:10.1257/aer.20141409]
15. Exley, C. L. (2016). Excusing selfishness in charitable giving: The role of risk. The Review of Economic Studies, 83(2), 587-628. [DOI:10.1093/restud/rdv051]
16. Exley, C. L., & Petrie, R. (2018). The impact of a surprise donation ask. Journal of Public Economics, 158, 152-167. [DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.12.015]
17. Exley, C. L., & Kessler, J. B. (2019). Motivated errors (No. w26595). National Bureau of Economic Research. [DOI:10.3386/w26595]
18. Gaertner, W., & Xu, Y. (1997). Optimization and external reference; a comparison of three axiomatic systems. Economics Letters, 57(1), 57-62. [DOI:10.1016/S0165-1765(97)81880-0]
19. Gaertner, W., & Xu, Y. (1999). On rationalizability of choice functions: A characterization of the median. Social Choice and Welfare, 16(4), 629-638. [DOI:10.1007/S003550050165]
20. Gaertner, W., & Xu, Y. (1999). On the structure of choice under different external references. Economic Theory, 14(3), 609-620. [DOI:10.1007/s001990050343]
21. Gaertner, W., & Xu, Y. (1999). Rationality and external reference. Rationality and Society, 11(2), 169-185. [DOI:10.1177/104346399011002003]
22. Geng, S., & Özbay, E. Y. (2021). Shortlisting procedure with a limited capacity. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 94, 102447. [DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.11.003]
23. Gino, F., & Ariely, D. (2012). The dark side of creativity: original thinkers can be more dishonest. Journal of personality and social psychology, 102(3), 445. [DOI:10.1037/a0026406] [PMID]
24. Gino, F., Norton, M. I., & Weber, R. A. (2016). Motivated Bayesians: Feeling moral while acting egoistically. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(3), 189-212. [DOI:10.1257/jep.30.3.189]
25. Gneezy, U., Saccardo, S., & Van Veldhuizen, R. (2019). Bribery: Behavioral drivers of distorted decisions. Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(3), 917-946. [DOI:10.1093/jeea/jvy043]
26. Grossman, Z., & Van der Weele, J. J. (2017). Self-image and willful ignorance in social decisions. Journal of the European Economic Association, 15(1), 173-217. [DOI:10.1093/jeea/jvw001]
27. Haisley, E. C., & Weber, R. A. (2010). Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior. Games and economic behavior, 68(2), 614-625. [DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.002]
28. Heller, Y. (2012). Justifiable choice. Games and Economic Behavior, 76(2), 375-390. [DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.001]
29. Kalai, G., Rubinstein, A., & Spiegler, R. (2002). Rationalizing choice functions by multiple rationales. Econometrica, 70(6), 2481-2488. [DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2002.00446.x]
30. Kimya, M. (2018). Choice, consideration sets, and attribute filters. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10(4), 223-47. [DOI:10.1257/mic.20150235]
31. Lehrer, E., & Teper, R. (2011). Justifiable preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(2), 762-774. [DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.007]
32. Lleras, J. S., Masatlioglu, Y., Nakajima, D., & Ozbay, E. Y. (2017). When more is less: Limited consideration. Journal of Economic Theory, 170, 70-85. [DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.004]
33. Manzini, P., & Mariotti, M. (2007). Sequentially rationalizable choice. American Economic Review, 97(5), 1824-1839. [DOI:10.1257/aer.97.5.1824]
34. Manzini, P., & Mariotti, M. (2012). Categorize then choose: Boundedly rational choice and welfare. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(5), 1141-1165. [DOI:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01078.x]
35. Masatlioglu, Y., Nakajima, D., & Ozbay, E. Y. (2012). Revealed attention. American Economic Review, 102(5), 2183-2205. [DOI:10.1257/aer.102.5.2183]
36. Pahlevan Yazdanabad, H. (2024). Justification within and between social contexts with the possibility of choice deferral. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 112, 102985. [DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102985]
37. Ridout, S. (2023). Distinguishing Preferences from Justifications. R&R at Social Choice and Welfare.
38. Rubinstein, A., & Salant, Y. (2006). A model of choice from lists. Theoretical Economics, 1(1), 3-17.
39. Salant, Y., & Rubinstein, A. (2008). (A, f): choice with frames. The Review of Economic Studies, 75(4), 1287-1296. [DOI:10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00510.x]
40. Schweitzer, M. E., & Hsee, C. K. (2002). Stretching the truth: Elastic justification and motivated communication of uncertain information. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 25(2), 185-201. [DOI:10.1023/A:1020647814263]
41. Sen, A. (1997). Maximization and the Act of Choice. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 745-779. [DOI:10.2307/2171939]
42. Snyder, M. L., Kleck, R. E., Strenta, A., & Mentzer, S. J. (1979). Avoidance of the handicapped: an attributional ambiguity analysis. Journal of personality and social psychology, 37(12), 2297. [DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.37.12.2297] [PMID]
43. Szpilrajn, E. (1930). Sur l'Extension De l'Ordre Partiel. Fundam. Math. 16, 386-9. [DOI:10.4064/fm-16-1-386-389]
44. Tyson, C. J. (2008). Cognitive constraints, contraction consistency, and the satisficing criterion. Journal of Economic Theory, 138(1), 51-70. [DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.019]
45. Tyson, C. J. (2015). Satisficing behavior with a secondary criterion. Social Choice and Welfare, 44(3), 639-661. [DOI:10.1007/s00355-014-0850-7]
46. Xu, Y. (2007). Norm-constrained choices. Analyse & Kritik, 29(2), 329-339. [DOI:10.1515/auk-2007-0213]
| Rights and permissions | |
.jpg) |
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. |
